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Acquisition programs are under pressure to deliver increasingly complex capability to 
the field without the cost growth associated with recent programs.  Evolutionary acquisition 
was adopted to help reduce system cost (through the use of mature technologies) and to 
improve system performance (through faster deployment of incremental capability).  While 
the ultimate verdict is not yet in on this decision, our previous simulation-based results have 
demonstrated that evolutionary acquisition can deliver improved capability more quickly than 
traditional acquisition, but that cost may actually increase over that of traditional acquisition.  
This is due to the overhead resulting from more frequent system deployment and update 
cycles.  Are there other factors that can help reduce the cost of evolutionary acquisition?  
This paper investigates the role of system modularity and production level in the cost of 
evolutionary acquisition.  Modularity typically imposes upfront costs in design and 
development, but may result in downstream savings in production and sustainment 
(including deployment of evolutionary new capability).  A simulation experiment is conducted 
to determine under which conditions cost increases are minimized. 
Introduction 
In today's fiscally constrained environment, cost is a major issue that must be 
addressed in military acquisition.  In particular, cost growth is of concern, where cost growth 
is the amount by which actual and projected costs increase over time from earlier cost 
estimates.  A recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that for 
the fiscal year 2008 portfolio of weapons systems, there has been cost growth of $296 
billion (GAO, 2009).  Cost growth can result in fewer systems being produced than 
envisioned or desired (e.g., the F-22), or in program cancellation (e.g., the Navy Area 
Missile Defense).  In the current and projected fiscal environment, there is considerable 
pressure to reduce costs and to rein in cost growth. 
One driver of cost is the uncertainty and risk associated with development of new 
technologies for systems.  In an effort to reduce this risk, and hence attempt to reduce costs 
and cost growth, evolutionary acquisition was adopted, whereby systems are developed 
using more mature technologies and deployed in increments of capability.  At the same 
time, sustainment cost is increasingly factored into the overall acquisition cost equation, 
especially as system lifetimes increase.  For instance, the contract for the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter calls for a combined production and sustainment supply network to promote cost 





Not enough evidence has been collected to establish the effectiveness of 
evolutionary acquisition and preliminary efforts to address sustainment costs.  Hence, our 
work uses computer simulation to assess the potential effectiveness of different strategies to 
address cost.  Previous work indicates that evolutionary acquisition alone may not be 
sufficient to control costs (Pennock & Rouse, 2008).  This paper investigates the 
effectiveness of evolutionary acquisition when system modularity and production level are 
considered.  Modularity is hypothesized to help reduce sustainment costs associated with 
maintenance, repair and technology upgrades. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses acquisition 
costs, cost growth and the potential role of system modularity in helping address both.  The 
simulation model used to study these issues is described in Section 3.  Section 4 presents 
an experiment conducted to test the effect of modularity and production level on cost.  
Section 5 provides analysis of the overall experimental results.  Section 6 focuses on those 
results relevant to evolutionary acquisition.  Finally, Section 7 concludes and presents future 
research directions. 
Acquisition Cost and Cost Growth 
High cost and cost overruns have long been an issue with military systems.  Cost 
growth occurs for a variety of reasons, including uncertainty and lack of knowledge about 
technology, design, and manufacturing (GAO, 2009).  Candreva (2009) points to the role of 
institutional factors in organizational failures such as cost growth.  One effort to address 
more cost effective acquisition was the introduction of evolutionary acquisition.  Under 
evolutionary acquisition, the focus is on using technologies for new systems that are 
relatively mature, as opposed to traditional acquisition, which emphasizes use of new and 
immature technologies.  The theory is that use of mature technologies tends to reduce cycle 
times for new system development, due to less risk in the technology development phase of 
acquisition (Johnson & Johnson, 2002).  This should translate into reduced cost growth. 
Our previous research has studied cost by focusing on the process aspects of 
acquisition.  For instance, we have demonstrated that evolutionary acquisition processes 
can yield quicker deployment of capability than traditional acquisition processes, but at 
potentially higher cost due to overhead from the increased frequency of development cycles 
(Pennock & Rouse, 2008).  This work did not address sustainment, however.  Sustainment 
is estimated to constitute approximately 60% of lifecycle cost (Andrews, 2003).  As a result, 
the acquisition community is putting more focus on sustainment, its associated costs and its 
potential for cost growth. 
One avenue that may help address high cost in sustainment is the concept of system 
modularity.  Modularity is an important concept in design of systems and products (Baldwin 
& Clark, 2000; Ulrich & Tung, 1991).  Modular design seeks to reduce the dependencies 
between various system components.  This has the potential to help improve the 
maintainability of a system over time and to reduce the cost of sustainment by facilitating 
repair and upgrade activities.  Little research has quantitatively studied reduction in 
sustainment due to modularity, though.  A number of hypotheses have been formulated in 
the research literature that are of interest in terms of the impact of modularity on cost. 
1. Increasing modularity decreases the cost of implementing technology 
upgrades for deployed systems (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Garud & 
Kumaraswamy, 1995; Gershenson, Prasad & Zhang, 2003; Huang & Kusiak, 





1. Increasing modularity decreases the mean time to repair a system 
that has failed and, hence, potentially the cost (Cheung & Hausman, 
1995; Gershenson et al., 2003; Tsai, Wang & Lo, 2003). 
2. Increasing modularity increases the upfront engineering design hours 
required for a system and hence potentially the cost (Ulrich, 1995). 
These hypotheses suggest that there is a trade-off between cost savings in 
sustainment due to system modularity and the cost of designing a modular system.  One 
goal of this paper is to explore this issue.  Previous work has demonstrated that increased 
system modularity tends to facilitate reduced sustainment costs, in terms of repair and 
technology upgrade activities (Bodner, Smith & Rouse, 2009).  The relationship is strongest 
for high levels of modularity, with diminishing returns as modularity levels are reduced.  
Thus, one question is what levels of modularity are required to balance the upstream costs 
of modularity design with the downstream savings from modularity. 
Model Description 
The simulation model used for this research can be characterized as three 
interacting sets of processes.  First, there are the systems being developed for deployment.  
These are housed within programs that conduct the various activities required for 
acquisition.  Second, there is the acquisition enterprise, which consists of a set of processes 
through which programs develop systems.  We address both procurement and sustainment.  
Finally, there are exogenous effects that impact systems and acquisition. 
We use discrete-event simulation, which has been used extensively for analysis of 
process-oriented domains such as acquisition (Law & Kelton, 2000).  Our model is 
implemented using ARENA 12.0, a commercially available and widely used discrete-event 
simulation package (Kelton, Sadowski & Sturrock, 2004).   
System Model 
The acquisition enterprise develops a number of different systems for military use.  In 
our model, a system is characterized primarily by its technologies in development and by its 
architecture in sustainment.  In development, each system has several technologies that 
must be matured and integrated into the system so that the system can be successfully 
deployed.  Each technology has an application area, a maturity level and a capability level.  
The application area describes the function of the technology (e.g., radar or stealth).  The 
maturity level dictates its stage of progress from new and potentially promising to proven 
and mature.  It is measured using the technological readiness level (TRL) scale (Kim, 2005) 
recently adopted by the DoD (DoD, 2006).  The capability level characterizes the functional 
capability of the technology relative to others in the same application area.   
In sustainment, the system architecture relates how different system components are 
arranged within the whole system.  This architecture provides the basis for systems to have 
a specified modularity.  In modeling system modularity, we assume that a system consists of 
n components, one of which is the system infrastructure.  The infrastructure serves as the 
platform that integrates other components, and it is assumed to be a large-scale and static 
in nature over the life of the system (e.g., an airframe).  Modularity is then conceptualized as 
a matrix denoting the relationships between components.  A relationship exists when two 
components are connected with each other, or more specifically when changes to one 





organized into modules, which then combine to form a system.  Relationships can then exist 
between components within a module, between modules, or between components spanning 
two different modules.  A relationship between two components affects whether a repair to a 
particular component requires a repair to another, and whether a technology upgrade to a 
particular component requires an upgrade to another. 
For a system k, composed of nk components, we define its repair modularity using an 
nk × nk matrix Rk.  Each entry rijk in this matrix represents the degree to which component i is 
related to component j for purposes of repair.  This is expressed as the Bernoulli probability 
that a repair to component i results in a repair to component j.  Similarly, we define Uk as the 
modularity matrix associated with technology upgrades, with uijk representing the Bernoulli 
probability that an upgrade to component i requires a compatibility upgrade to component j.  
Note that neither Rk nor Uk is assumed to be symmetrical.  Figure 1 illustrates the concept of 
a repair modularity matrix Rk with nk = 6.  In the matrix, diagonal elements are defined to 
equal 1.0.  In addition, component 1 is defined to be the infrastructure, and we assume that 
r1jk =1.0 for all j ≠ 1, and that ri1k = 0.0 for all i ≠ 1.  In other words, all components are 
assumed to be affected by a change in infrastructure, while infrastructure is assumed not to 
be affected by a change in any component. 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.5
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Figure 1. System Modularity 
We use the concept of a modularity index to parameterize the extent to which a 
system is modular (Guo & Gershenson, 2004; Hölttä-Otto & de Weck, 2007).  Since 
modularity is matrix-based and, hence, multidimensional in nature, an index provides a more 
concise characterization of modularity.  Our particular index for a repair modularity matrix is 












This index is the average of the probabilities that two different non-infrastructure 
components are related for repair purposes.  A system whose index mrk  is small, is 
considered more modular that one whose index is large.  The modularity index muk for 
technology upgrades is defined similarly. 
A system typically has a projected production level, targeted to provide the number 
of units needed to meet the need for which the system is being developed.  This projected 
production level can change over time, as threats change, as new technologies/systems 






Acquisition Enterprise Model—Procurement 
The acquisition enterprise consists of the five phases of a defense acquisition 
program, as defined by the DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DoD, 2006).  These 
phases include concept development, technology development, system development, 
production & deployment, and operations & support.  Here, the focus is on the procurement 
phases of acquisition, i.e., the first four phases.  Operations and support is analogous to 
sustainment and is discussed in the next section.  These phases are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Phases of Acquisition 
A program starts in the first phase and proceeds through the remaining phases.  
Sometimes, this process involves concurrency, or overlap between parts of two different 
phases (e.g., overlap between final testing in system development and low rate initial 
production).  In the procurement phases (the first four phases of acquisition), each phase is 
characterized by duration and a cost for the program.  Once a phase is concluded, the 
program moves onto the next phase.  The model assumes no concurrency.  This basic 
model, which does not incorporate modularity or production level, is described in greater 
detail by Pennock and Rouse (2008), who also discuss the parameters used for cost and 
duration figures for the various procurement phases.  Elaborations in system development 
and in production are discussed below. 
 Concept development.  Concept development is assumed to last for a duration of 
between 2 and 7.5 years, with a mode of 4.9.  Cost is assumed to be a linear 
function of duration, with rate $20 million/year. 
 Technology development.  The cost and duration of the technology development 
phase depends on whether the program is using evolutionary or traditional 
acquisition, as the program must mature the technologies to be used for the 
system if it uses traditional acquisition.  Technologies for systems being acquired 
are developed exogenously to the acquisition enterprise, from the military 
science and technology (S&T) enterprise.  These technologies are then brought 
into a program when needed in the technology development phase.  The maturity 
level of the technologies brought into a program is used to characterize 
traditional acquisition versus evolutionary acquisition.  The development process 
is risky, in that individual technologies may fail, thus causing a longer technology 
development phase (and higher cost) for the program.  A program that uses 
immature technologies typically has a longer, costlier and riskier technology 
development phase than one that uses relatively more mature technologies.  The 
duration and cost of this phase is the time and cost needed to develop the 
needed technologies for the system. 
 System development.  Here, we assume that the development cost and time are 
















of modularity.  We assume a linear relationship between cost and time.  For 
simplicity, repair and upgrade modularity are assumed to be the same in the 
model, with a modularity index denoted simply as mrk = muk = mk.  Recall that as 
mk increases, the system is characterized by a lesser degree of modularity.  We 




Here, A is a scale factor related to the time in years, and a is a scale factor 
that represents the increasing effort it takes to make a system marginally 
more modular.  In the model, system development time is scaled to lie 
between 1.5 and 8 years, and its cost is a linear function of duration at a rate 
of $1,000 million. 
 Production & deployment.  The cost and duration of the production phase are, 
obviously, dependent on the production level of the system in question.  We use 
the Cobb-Douglas production function, a standard micro-economic model that 
relates input units to units produced to allow for increasing, constant or 
decreasing returns to scale (Kreps, 1990).  Letting Xk = input resources used for 
system k, Pk = production of k, and b = scale factor, the functional form is 
b
kk XP =  
Inputs here are capital, labor and materials.  Letting b > 0 yields increasing 
returns to scale, which is typical for production of complex systems.  
Assuming a constant cost for inputs Bk, and letting Zk = the cost of the 









To determine the mean time needed for the production phase for a given 
production level, Zk is scaled to a cost between $6,000 million and $18,800 
million, and the production time is determined using a linear relationship 
between cost and duration with a rate of $4,000 million/year. 
Acquisition Enterprise Model—Sustainment 
The sustainment model includes repairs and technology upgrades for a particular 
system k.  The production level Pk is assumed to be the fleet size for the duration of 
sustainment (i.e., no systems are lost or retired).  Failures and technology upgrades are 
assumed to occur randomly according to a Poisson process.  Each failure or technology 
upgrade affects only one component directly.  Due to modularity, though, a repair to 
component i may require a repair to another component j (with probability rijk).  Similarly, an 
upgrade to i may require an upgrade to another component j (with probability uijk).  The rates 
for the failure and technology upgrade processes are defined below. 
 fi is the failure rate associated with component i. 
 gi is the repair rate associated with component i. 
 ti is the arrival rate of new technology upgrades for component i. 





 pi is the cost of repairing component i. 
 qi is the cost associated with a technology upgrade to component i. 
 cij is the compatibility cost associated with making component j technologically 
compatible with component i if i is upgraded, and if the interaction between i and j 
necessitates that j be made compatible to the new technology for i. 
Since infrastructure is not affected by repairs or technology upgrades, we assume 
that f1, g1, t1, v1, p1, q1, ci1 and c1j are not defined.  In general, it is assumed that fi > ti, gi > vi, 
and pi < qi. 
Once a system is deployed into sustainment, it experiences failures and technology 
upgrades for its various components according to the above rates.  Technology upgrades 
are a significant concern for systems with long sustainment lifecycles (Singh & Sandborn, 
2006).  A failure invokes a repair process, and a technology upgrade opportunity invokes an 
upgrade process.  Upon occurrence of a failure in component i, all other components j (≠ 1) 
with rijk > 0 are evaluated probabilistically, using random number generation, to determine if 
a repair is necessary for j.  Any additional components are then repaired.  The cost is the 
summation of the repair to the original component i and the cost of other components being 
repaired.  Upon occurrence of a technology upgrade for component i, all other components j 
(≠ 1) with uijk > 0 are evaluated probabilistically, using random number generation, to 
determine if a compatibility upgrade is necessary for j.  Any additional components are then 
made compatible.  The cost is the summation of the summation to the original component i 
and the cost of other components being made compatible.  If a failure or technology 
upgrade for i arrives while the system is in downtime, that failure or technology upgrade 
queues until the downtime is resolved.  Multiple entities in this queue are processed first-
come-first-served.  This process continues for the sustainment life of the system over the 
active fleet, which is assume to range between 15 and 40 years, with a mode of 20 years at 
a median rate of $965 million per year.  The actual rate is influenced by the production level. 
This model provides cost for the direct activities involving maintenance and repair 
(including upgrades) within the sustainment phases.  Clearly, sustainment encompasses 
many other costs.  Unger (2009) presents analysis of the sustainment cost categories from 
the DoD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) for Air Force programs.  Approximately 
52.5% of sustainment cost can be categorized as related to maintenance and repair.  We 
assume that approximately half of these costs (i.e., 25% of sustainment costs) are tied to 
direct repair and upgrade activities represented in our sustainment model. 
It should be noted that there is no effect on the sustainment phase from the 
acquisition policy used in the procurement phases (i.e., traditional versus evolutionary). 
Exogenous Model 
Exogenous to the acquisition enterprise are two important outside influences.  The 
first is a model of technical progress, which represents basic research performed in the 
commercial world or via non-defense government funding.  Results from this model are 
immature technologies that are input into the second exogenous influence, the DoD science 
and technology (S&T) enterprise.  These new technologies enter the S&T enterprise at TRL 
1.  Technologies generated by the model of technological progress increase in capability as 
time progresses using a capability growth function that combines a learning effect (from 






The technology development process model matures new technologies for DoD 
systems, typically using a staged process of development whereby ideas are reduced to 
working technologies that can be integrated into a system.  There is considerable technical 
risk in the development process, as ideas often do not work in practice, do not scale up to 
production, or do not integrate into systems.  The staged process mitigates risk by not fully 
funding a technology's development, allowing it to be culled if it fails or if it is outpaced by 
competing technologies.  It should be noted that the S&T enterprise model consists of a 
single, unified organization, rather than the myriad agencies that comprise the actual DoD 
S&T enterprise. 
Experiment 
This section describes the experiment to be conducted. 
Parameters 
We use the following parameter values in the simulation model for the experiment: 
 a = 1.3 
 b = 1.25 
 1/ti ~ Triangular (5, 8, 15) years for all i and over all systems 
 1/fi ~ Triangular (1.5, 2.5, 4) years for all i and over all systems 
 pi ~ uniform (0.025, 0.075) $ million for all i and over all systems 
 qi ~ uniform (0.2, 0.2375) $ million for all i and over all systems 
 cij = $0.1 million for all i and j and over all systems 
 k = 6 over all systems 
It should be noted that ti and fi are parameters for Poisson processes, and that their 
inverses are the inter-arrival times for those respective processes, distributed as exponential 
variables.  Thus, their inter-arrival times are shown here.  Repair times and upgrade times 
are assumed to be instantaneous. 
Experimental Design 
The goal is to study the effect of system modularity and production level on 
acquisition cost, including sustainment, with a particular focus on cost of evolutionary 
acquisition.  Thus, we adopt a factorial experimental design with three independent 
variables, as outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Experimental Design 
Independent Variable Level 1 Level 2 
Acquisition Policy Traditional Evolutionary 
Modularity Index 0.50 (Low) 0.25 (High) 





This results in a 23 factorial experiment.  We are interested in studying the following 
six dependent variables: 
 C1 = program procurement cost 
 C2 = program sustainment cost 
 C3 = total program cost = C1 + C2 
 C4 = annualized procurement cost over all systems 
 C5 = annualized sustainment cost over all systems 
 C6 = annualized cost over all systems = C4 + C5 
Each simulation replication is run for a period of 150 years, with a warm-up period of 
50 years preceding.  This allows analysis of the steady-state enterprise behavior, since the 
enterprise model needs a warm-up period to reach steady-state.  After the warm-up period, 
the statistics collection begins.  Ten replications of each combination of factors are 
conducted to allow for statistical significance. 
Experimental Results 
Table 2 provides summary experimental results.  Columns two through four contain 
the level of each independent variable as shown in Table 1.  The value shown for each 
dependent variable in columns five through ten is the average over the ten replications.  The 
units of the dependent variables are in millions $. 
Table 1. Summary Experimental Results 
Run Policy Mod. Prod. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
1 1 1 1 12,657 22,248 34,906 5,305 5,075 10,380
2 1 1 2 18,640 26,409 45,049 6,378 5,653 12,031
3 1 2 1 13,832 20,623 34,455 5,378 4,441 9,819
4 1 2 2 20,078 23,096 43,174 6,189 4,296 10,485
5 2 1 1 11,518 22,248 33,766 5,960 6,316 12,276
6 2 1 2 17,548 26,409 43,957 7,071 6,556 13,627
7 2 2 1 12,629 20,623 33,252 5,884 5,210 11,094
8 2 2 2 18,910 23,200 42,109 6,981 5,290 12,271
Analysis of Overall Results 
We use a balanced analysis of variance (ANOVA) method to determine which 
independent variables (or factors) have significant effects (Box, Hunter & Hunter, 1978).  
The ANOVA also computes whether there are significant interaction effects among more 
than one factor.  In performing the analysis of variance for this experiment, Minitab® version 
15 software is used.  Tables 3 through 8 report the analysis of variance for each of the 
dependent variables, C1 through C6, respectively.  Main effects from each independent 





Table 2. Analysis of Variance for Program Procurement Cost (C1) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 26486575 26486575 384.31 0
Mod 1 32315116 32315116 468.88 0
Prod 1 752794480 7.53E+08 10922.85 0
Policy*Mod 1 24451 24451 0.35 0.553
Policy*Prod 1 8505 8505 0.12 0.726
Mod*Prod 1 330508 330508 4.8 0.032
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 207 207 0 0.956
Error 72 4962185 68919  
Total 79 816922028  
From the analysis, we infer that each of the main effects are significant (with p < 
0.10), as is the interaction effect between modularity and production level.  Similar to 
Pennock and Rouse (2008), programs using evolutionary acquisition tend to have a lower 
program cost than those using traditional acquisition, due to higher technology development 
costs.  As expected, low levels of modularity have lower procurement costs, due to less 
systems engineering work in the development phase.  Also as expected, higher production 
levels lead to higher procurement costs.  High modularity and high production level interact 
to increase procurement cost more than each individual factor. 
Table 3. Analysis of Variance for Program Sustainment Cost (C2) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Mod 1 119354720 119354720 63.02 0
Prod 1 223440510 223440510 117.97 0
Policy*Mod 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Policy*Prod 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Mod*Prod 1 13382709 13382709 7.07 0.01
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 13394 13394 0.01 0.933
Error 72 136366569 1893980  
Total 79 492598085  
For sustainment cost, there is no effect from acquisition policy.  This is to be 
expected, since the simulation model assumes no difference in the sustainment profile 
between the two policies.  However, the effects from modularity, production level and their 
interaction are significant.  Low levels of modularity tend to cause higher sustainment costs, 
and high production levels, of course, result in higher sustainment costs.  Introducing high 






Table 4. Analysis of Variance for Total Program Cost (C3) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 25308713 25308713 12.6 0.001
Mod 1 27460953 27460953 13.67 0
Prod 1 1796490516 1796490516 894.42 0
Policy*Mod 1 1651 1651 0 0.977
Policy*Prod 1 43247 43247 0.02 0.884
Mod*Prod 1 9506987 9506987 4.73 0.033
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 10271 10271 0.01 0.943
Error 72 144615531 2008549  
Total 79 2003437868  
 
Looking at total program cost, each of the main effects is significant, as is the 
interaction between modularity and production level.  The effect of the main factors is 
explained by the combined effect of these factors on the constituents of C3 (i.e., C1 and C2).  
However, the effect of modularity combines opposite effects noted in C1 and C2.  The effect 
of reduced cost from increased modularity noted in sustainment cost wins out, as 
sustainment costs overpower development costs.  Similarly, the interaction effects between 
modularity and production level in each of the constituents are in opposite directions.  Once 
again, the effect from sustainment costs wins out, and we can infer that high modularity 
helps mitigate the effect of cost increases due to high production levels. 
Table 5. Analysis of Variance for Annualized Procurement Cost (C4) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 8745812 8745812 853.98 0
Mod 1 99301 99301 9.7 0.003
Prod 1 20921804 20921804 2042.9 0
Policy*Mod 1 3027 3027 0.3 0.588
Policy*Prod 1 131703 131703 12.86 0.001
Mod*Prod 1 94557 94557 9.23 0.003
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 78033 78033 7.62 0.007
Error 72 737368 10241  
Total 79 30811604  
 
In analyzing annualized procurement cost, we find that each of the main effects is 
significant, as are most of the interaction effects.  Confirming Pennock and Rouse (2008), 
the annualized procurement cost for evolutionary acquisition is significantly higher than that 
of traditional acquisition.  This is due to the higher number of refresh procurement cycles.  
Similar to C1, high production levels are associated with higher annualized costs.  However, 
in this case, low levels of modularity are associated with higher annualized costs, in contrast 
to the effect from C1.  This is likely due to the increased development time required for high 
levels of modularity, which reduces the number of systems deployed over the lifecycle and, 
hence, the annualized cost.  Likewise, there is a corresponding significant interaction effect 
between modularity and production levels whereby low levels of modularity in conjunction 
with high production levels are associated with increased costs.  Interestingly, there is a 





increased number of programs under evolutionary acquisition interacts with high production 
levels to increase annualized procurement costs more than each individual factor.  Finally, 
there is a three-way interaction effect among all independent variables.  This is manifested 
as a reduction in the difference in cost between different production levels and acquisition 
policies as modularity level is increased. 
Table 6. Analysis of Variance for Annualized Sustainment Cost (C5) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 19079848 19079848 134.12 0
Mod 1 23789768 23789768 167.23 0
Prod 1 707084 707084 4.97 0.029
Policy*Mod 1 181790 181790 1.28 0.262
Policy*Prod 1 16048 16048 0.11 0.738
Mod*Prod 1 971557 971557 6.83 0.011
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 397276 397276 2.79 0.099
Error 72 10242758 142261  
Total 79 55386129  
For annualized sustainment cost, the three main effects are again significant.  For 
modularity and production level, these effects are consistent with the reasons noted for 
program sustainment cost C2.  For acquisition policy, the effect is consistent with the 
analysis for annualized procurement cost C4, i.e., the increased number of refresh cycles 
means that there is an increased number of programs needing sustainment.  In this model, 
we assume that the program sustainment profiles are the same under evolutionary and 
traditional acquisition.  This does not account for the possibility that, under an evolutionary 
system, it may be the case that system lifecycles are reduced, allowing a reduction in 
sustainment costs.  The interaction effect between modularity and production level is 
consistent with the effect noted for individual program sustainment cost C2, whereby high 
modularity mitigates cost increases associated with high levels of production. 
Table 7. Analysis of Variance for Annualized Total Cost (C6) 
Source DF SS MS F p 
Policy 1 53661197 53661197 292.72 0
Mod 1 26963050 26963050 147.08 0
Prod 1 29321345 29321345 159.95 0
Policy*Mod 1 231729 231729 1.26 0.265
Policy*Prod 1 55804 55804 0.3 0.583
Mod*Prod 1 1672308 1672308 9.12 0.003
Policy*Mod*Prod 1 827448 827448 4.51 0.037
Error 72 13199104 183321  
Total 79 125931985  
Finally, in terms of annualized total cost, each of the three main effects is significant, 
as is the interaction effect between modularity and production level.  The effect for 
acquisition policy is explained by the effect noted for the constituents of C6 (i.e., C4 and C5), 
i.e., the increased number of programs due to evolutionary acquisition.  The effect for 





increasing procurement costs, while the effect of production level is explained simply by the 
increased cost of producing and sustaining more units. 
Analysis of Evolutionary Acquisition 
We now focus on evolutionary acquisition by analyzing the experimental results that 
just pertain to it.  The observations below summarize our findings relative to those of the 
overall experiment.  These results come from reducing the observations to a 22 factorial 
experiment involving only modularity and production level as independent variables. 
 For C1, the program procurement cost, both modularity and production level have 
similar significant effects.  The interaction effect is somewhat weaker, though, 
registering only a p-value of 0.136.  Thus, we infer that this interaction effect 
predominates for traditional acquisition due to the relatively larger program 
procurement cost. 
 Similarly, for C2, the annualized sustainment cost, both modularity and production 
level have the same type of significant effect.  The interaction effect is also 
somewhat weaker than in the overall experiment, with a p-value of 0.077. 
 The same observations hold for C3.  Here, for the effect of modularity and the 
interaction effect between modularity and production level, the sustainment cost 
predominates, causing increased modularity to have a reducing effect on the 
total program cost.  The p-value for the interaction effect is relatively weak at 
0.138. 
 For the annualized costs (C4, C5 and C6), modularity retains its significant effect 
in the same direction as in the overall experiment.  However, production level is 
significant only for C4 and C6.  In addition, the interaction effect between 
modularity and production is not significant across the three dependent variables.  
This is likely captured in the three-way interaction effect among the three 
independent variables noted in the overall experiment for C4, C5 and C6.  It may 
be that additional replications are needed to get statistically significant results for 
these effects.  This bears further investigation. 
Discussion and Future Research 
The above results imply a number of conclusions relevant for military acquisition.   
 Increased system modularity yields increases in the system development cost, 
but the decrease in sustainment cost over the system lifecycle may more than 
compensate for these increased costs.  This points to the need to view 
acquisition as an investment process.  While the short-term budgeting nature of 
the federal government works against this perspective, a longer term view does 
show the benefit of investing current costs to achieve long-term savings. 
 Modularity can help mitigate the cost increases associated with higher production 
levels through an interaction effect between these two factors. Similar to the 
previous point, this effect involves the way in which sustainment costs overpower 
those of development, due to long lifecycles. 
 Evolutionary acquisition seems less susceptible, especially from an annualized 
cost point of view, to this interaction effect between modularity and production 





programs that do maintain characteristics of traditional acquisition may wish to 
investigate this phenomenon. 
 Evolutionary acquisition may decrease individual program costs, but the more 
frequent refresh cycles may drive cost growth in overall procurement and 
sustainment.  Thus, discretion is needed in managing these refresh cycles, 
especially when high production levels are involved. 
This work has addressed the process aspects of the acquisition enterprise.  Clearly, 
processes are an important and critical part of the acquisition enterprise.  However, 
acquisition occurs in the context of organizational behavior that is impacted by incentives 
and information availability.  The DoD has spent significant resources on incentive programs 
to facilitate positive acquisition outcomes.  Some research suggests that these resources 
have not been used effectively (GAO, 2005).  However, economic research suggests that it 
is possible to design incentive programs under different information availability scenarios 
(Hildebrandt, 2009).  Thus, an avenue of future research is to integrate organizational 
behavior modeling of acquisition, combined with process modeling. 
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